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Common in sectors such as petroleum, investment contracts embody the well-established 
principle of pacta sunt servanda (“agreements must be kept”) for which there is a long history 
of international jurisprudence. Where they provide directly for international arbitration, such 
contracts can obviate the need for a specialized treaty regime. In contrast to heavily 
standardized international investment agreements (IIAs), contracts allow parties to tailor their 
commitments, often by reference to industry practice and clearly defined goals. With 
negotiated contractual protections in place, countries receive the benefit of FDI in the form 
and manner of their choosing, just as investors enjoy the assurance of host countries’ binding 
commitment to honor their obligations.  
 
Given this flexibility and legal certainty, some observers have advocated investment contracts 
as a substitute for IIAs, partly because of suspicion over the IIA regime’s legitimacy.2 Yet 
most foreign investment is not covered by individual contracts with host countries, and 
contract-based arbitration currently represents only a small portion of total investor-state 
claims.
3
 The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) reported in 
2016 that investment contracts were the source of tribunals’ jurisdiction in only 17% of 
cases.
4
 More tellingly, the portion of contract-based claims at ICSID has steadily declined 
since 2010, when it comprised 22% of all claims.
5
 This trend may indicate that there are good 
reasons to be suspicious of investment contracts as a replacement of IIAs: 
 
 Although IIAs contain indeterminate concepts such as fair and equitable treatment and 
indirect expropriation, some contracts do the same: albeit well-developed, the common 
law of commercial contracts is hardly free from ambiguity, as evidenced by recent high-
level judgments.
6
 Moreover, it is far from clear that there is indeed a body of international 
commercial rules (known as lex mercatoria, or “merchant law”) to assist in interpreting 




 Without IIAs, investors would have to negotiate contracts with countries on an individual 
basis. This may well be within the resources of large multinational enterprises (MNEs) in 
the infrastructure or extractive sectors where such contracts are more common. But the 
transaction costs would be onerous for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) 
operating in other sectors where SMEs are the direct beneficiaries of IIAs signed by their 
home countries. This is problematic as more SMEs undertake outward FDI, relative to 
large MNEs.
8
 Indeed, governments negotiating trade agreements with investment chapters 
2 
 
regularly point out the strategic advantages of these instruments for SMEs.
9 Furthermore, 
given that more than 100,000 MNEs exist (with more than 1 million foreign affiliates), 




 While parties can negotiate situation-specific terms in investment contracts in a manner 
impossible with respect to IIAs, it is equally plausible that the one-sided bargaining power 
thought to characterize treaty drafting may also accompany investment-contract 
negotiations. Highly mobile investors (likely those safest from governmental interference) 
may be able to extract benefits from host countries by threatening to relocate
11
 or simply 
through more assertive negotiations assisted by expensive counsel unavailable to many 
governments. This may be especially the case in extractive sector concession 
arrangements with developing countries. Of course, unequal bargaining power can act 
against foreign investors, too, most notably in the case of investment contracts structured 
as joint ventures. Investors have demonstrated reluctance to pursue these types of 
contracts with host countries because of the difficulties involved in divided management, 





Finally, the use of investment contracts instead of IIAs does nothing to resolve problems 
associated with investor-state dispute settlement, as such contracts also tend to provide for 
international arbitration (at ICSID, for example). Without reform of the underlying regime, 
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